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Practice of Clinical Sociology

Clinical Sociology and Preventing
Nuclear War

Louis Kriesberg
Syracuse University

ABSTRACT
This paper outlines major kinds of social science research, especially sociological,
that have relevance for nuclear war prevention and that would be relevant to a variety
of clients. Research that has been done as well as work that could be done to help
prevent nuclear war are noted. The research topics are related to policy suggestions
about lessening the risks of nuclear war. The emphasis is on research relevant to a
wide range of US clients and who are not operating in a very short time frame.

Clinical sociological work relating to nuclear war, like any clinical work, is done
with clients in mind. In the case of nuclear war, there are a great variety of
possible clients. They include the American public, the US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, congressional candidates, the Nuclear Freeze Movement,
college students, the Soviet Institute for United States and Canadian Studies,
and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. We may be working
for a client at the client's request or we may be self-appointed. We may be paid
by one party to provide information and service to another party, as when
foundations support an educational project.
In recent years the number of possible clients in this area has grown significantly. Universities have always been a possible sponsor, since they provide
students with concerns about avoiding war and support for research. Recently,
student interest in international affairs and in avoiding nuclear war has grown
greatly. University centers on peace and conflict studies are growing, vis, the
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University of California. In addition, many foundations have expanded their
programs in the areas of peace and national security, preventing nuclear war,
and conflict resolution, e.g., the Mac Arthur and the Carnegie Foundations. State
and national institutions working in this problem area are emerging, e.g., the
US Institute of Peace. In some Western European countries, peace movement
organizations and centers of peace conflict studies are mutually helpful; that is
beginning in the US also. In addition, the traditional government agencies and
think tanks continue to support policy-relevant research.
Clinical work in this area has some unique features, but it also shares many
problems with other areas of clinical work. Certainly, the threat of a nuclear
war involves a uniquely extended and complex interaction of factors. In the
midst of this complexity, at least one issue is not problematic. Everyone agrees
that nuclear war should be avoided. But this does not mean that value issues are
irrelevant. In this area, as in others, value differences exist. Different means of
avoiding nuclear war have different moral implications; people differ about the
morality of paying particular costs and taking certain risks. I will not address
those issues in this paper; mapping out research relevant to clinical work oriented
to preventing nuclear war is enough of a task.
It is assumed in this paper that we lack sociological theory and established
knowledge that can be directly applied by clinicians to prevent nuclear war. We
need more and better relevant research and the development of better grounded
theory. Obviously, action to avert a nuclear war cannot wait until all the evidence
is in. We must act on the basis of what we know. In this paper the kinds of
knowledge being gathered as well as the kinds of research which are particularly
needed are outlined.
For research to have clinical application, it must have reference to factors
and conditions which are modifiable by particular persons. Of course, what is
and is not modifiable depends on the time frame being considered. What is and
is not modifiable also depends on the power of the actor who is considering
policy alternatives. What kind of research has clinical relevance, then, depends
on who the client is.
The sociological approach can contribute in many ways to reducing the risk
of nuclear war. Thus, theoretical work on the social construction of reality and
the relationship between images of reality and social action has great pertinence.
For example, the varying meanings assigned to such terms as "security," "defense, "and "nationalism" can channel conduct in different directions (Stephenson, 1982). In addition, sociological work on the relationships between
different social levels (e.g., interpersonal relations, small groups, large-scale
organizations, and societies) can be the source of significant insights. Related
to these areas is the theoretical work on crosscutting and overlapping conflicts
and bonds (Coser, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1959; Kriesberg, 1982).
Sociological research methods also have useful applications in studying
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factors relating to nuclear war, for example, methods related to using large data
sets. But in many ways the sociological research tradition has weaknesses in
analyzing the risks of war. The policy interest in nuclear war is a clinical one.
Policy makers are concerned with a particular event. How general processes
interact to affect particular cases requires paying attention to the historically
unique conditions, and we sociologists are only beginning to reflect on how that
specification is to be done. Furthermore, in considering alternative policies to
avert nuclear war, we are concerned with hypothetical phenomena. We sociologists are ill-prepared to examine hypothetical events. We must think about ways
to reason about future possibilities, for example, using projections, analogies,
and simulations.
To organize the discussion of research relevant to policies to reduce the risk
of war, I will discuss the major explanations for the emergence and escalation
of international conflicts into wars. Three kinds of explanations are often given.
One explanation stresses domestic factors; a second emphasizes the interactions
among national governments or other transnational actors; and the third stresses
the global system within which governments and other transnational actors operate (Beer, 1981).
DOMESTIC FACTORS
That wars spring from internal sources of one or more societies is an old idea.
Some countries are said to be inherently militaristic, aggressive, or expansionist.
Less extremely stated, the dynamics of domestic organizations may impel governments to threaten or to attack others or to act in ways that appear threatening
or harmful to people in other societies. Although attributes of countries have not
been found to be highly related to wars, they make some contribution to the
outbreak of war in conjunction with relational and systemic factors (Weede,
1984; Zinnes, 1980).
Four ways domestic factors contribute to escalating conflict and raising the
risk of nuclear war deserve attention. First, popular identification with the nationstate and ethnocentric chauvinism may handicap responsiveness or even understanding of the interests of people in adversary countries (LeVine and Campbell,
1972; Smith, 1971).
Second, popular belief in the effectiveness and necessity of being tough and
relying on nuclear weapons or other kinds of violence can interfere with taking
conciliatory actions even when they are appropriate. For example, during the
Cold War, some deescalating initiatives taken by Khrushchev were quickly
dismissed. It is also possible that popular opposition to armed resistance makes
a society appear weak and vulnerable, thus inviting aggression or even attack.
Third, leaders may tend to emphasize military power and confrontations
with external adversaries (Sanders, 1983; Wolfe, 1979). They may be motivated

94

CLINICAL SOCIOLOGY REVIEW/1986

by expectations that this serves to mobilize support for many goals. But it may
also contribute to an escalation dynamic in foreign relations. Conversely, leaders
who are not resistant to external threats may lose office or invite external aggression and later war.
Finally, organizations that are charged with preparing for military defense
may expand for internal reasons, unrelated to external adversaries. Other organizations or interest groups may support foreign policies which peoples in
other countries experience as economically or ideologically threatening.
There is some research on how these aspects affect the likelihood of nuclear
war. More is needed. There are also suggestions on how each can be changed
to reduce the risk of nuclear war. But which ones are feasible and effective?
Research and analysis can help us decide. Research that is clinically relevant for
each of these aspects will be noted.
Chauvinism
It can be argued that reduction in popular chauvinism and exclusive national
loyalties would encourage government leaders to be responsive to the concerns
of their counterparts from other countries and to pursue less chauvinistic goals.
One way to reduce popular chauvinism and exclusive state loyalties might
be to raise the salience of other identities and commitments. Research needs to
be done on the extent to which persons and groups in the US, the USSR, and
other countries have ethnic, occupational, ideological, and other transnational
ties and identities. We also need research on the sources and consequences of
such transnational ties and identities. For example, research might be based on
interviews with persons in one or more countries who do and do not belong to
international nongovernmental organizations (Evan, 1981). Research might also
be based upon survey data relating transnational identities and foreign policy
preferences. Such research could draw upon and contribute to our theories about
system boundary maintenance, crosscutting ties, and relations among different
levels of social organization (Grodzins, 1956). Theories about socialization and
self-concepts are also relevant (Lambert and Kleinberg, 1967). For example,
school instruction stressing nonviolence or military values significantly affects
children's outlook on war (Tolley, 1973).
Popular Militance
Research on reducing popular support for toughness, militance, and reliance on
nuclear weapons is pertinent to the second aspect of domestic factors. One way
to lessen the risks of nuclear war is to reduce popular reliance on nuclear weapons
for national defense. This might entail increasing support for reliance on con-
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ventional military forces and even for using nonmilitary coercion and positive
sanctions (Fischer, 1984; Sharp, 1973).
Research could help account for changing popular support for reliance on
nuclear weapons and thus suggest how it could be reduced. Research could also
assess how that reduction might contribute to lessening, or perhaps enhancing,
the risks of nuclear war. The research needs to be historically and country specific
and not limited to the US or to NATO members.
The major kind of research sociologists conduct in this area focuses on the
nature, sources, and consequences of popular support for alternative means of
defense. Support is usually assessed by analyzing surveys, electoral conduct,
public statements, and literary products. A fundamental issue is the extent to
which variations in such support arise from domestic sources or respond to the
actions of adversaries. There is evidence that general shifts in such support are
explicable to a significant degree in terms of domestic sources (Gamson and
Modigliani, 1971; Kriesberg and Quader, 1984; Rosi, 1965).
A related issue is the degree to which popular or subelite views develop
autonomously and significantly affect the conduct of holders of policymaking
positions or conversely the extent to which policymaking elites control and direct
the popular and subelite views. The evidence is mixed depending upon the policy
matter (Hughes, 1978). At least on major, salient, and long-term matters, the
public does not simply follow elite views (Barton, 1974–1975; Kriesberg et al.,
1982; Lo, 1982).
A more difficult research issue is the effect of increased support for nonnuclear or nonmilitary means upon the likelihood of war and war escalation. For
example, research could usefully be done about the possible counterproductivity
of peace movements in the 1930s in the face of Fascism and in the late 1960s
during the Vietnam War. Thus, it might be argued that those peace movements
reduced the resolve and the appearance of resolve of their government officials
and therefore contributed to the aggressiveness of adversary governments and
hence to conflict escalation. On the other hand, it might be argued that such
peace movements have limited conflict escalation or could have if they had been
larger and allied with peace movements in adversary countries.
Leaders' Militance
The third domestic aspect related to the risk of nuclear war pertains to the leaders'
own identification with their state or organization and their reliance on military
means of struggle. Reducing the identification of the leaders with their governments (the "state is me" syndrome) could improve the accuracy of their perceptions of the adversaries and facilitate their responsiveness to the adversaries
(Naroll et al., 1974). Suggestions for reducing identification with the state might
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include expanding other identifications and career alternatives. Leading positions
in global institutions or important domestic organizations conceivably could
reduce overidentification with the state, at least in small countries. That possibility is worth studying.
High officials' reliance on military means for waging conflict might be
reduced if other symbols of loyalty and patriotism were available for them to
use to rally support. The alternatives developed in societies with minimal emphasis on the military (e.g., Costa Rica) might be studied. Alternative ways for
government leaders to express their power might also be considered in such
cases.
Organizational Imperatives
The fourth domestic area pertains to the dynamics of military defense related
organizations which may expand independently of adversary conduct. But sometimes organizations stagnate and decline and we need to explain both directions
of change (Kriesberg, 1984). Periods of reducing military expenditures might
be compared to periods of expansion, e.g., Soviet reductions in the early years
of Khrushchev's regime and increases in the early Brezhnev years. How coalitions are formed to support the development of "big ticket" military items is
worthy of further investigation (Etzioni, 1984).
What suggestions are there to limit or reduce the growth of defense organizations and policies driven by a dynamic that is independent of an adversary's
conduct? One suggestion has been the development of conversion plans and
alternative work for those employed in defense industries; more analysis of
communities where defense-related industries have been closed would be useful.
Comparable information about the Soviet experience would be desirable.
INTERACTION FACTORS
Conflicts are social relations; hence, interactions among adversaries must play
a major role in the escalation of a conflict into war, even nuclear war. Several
problems in interaction can contribute to the deterioration of relations and the
outbreak of war. One side may act so antagonistically as to provoke an escalatory
response. It is also possible for one side to act in such a conciliatory fashion that
the adversary's expectations and demands are raised, further escalating the conflict. Even when negotiations are attempted, they may break down or produce
disappointing, hence, unstable agreements.
I will consider policy suggestions about ways to 1) interrupt escalation, 2)
conduct negotiations, and 3) reach lasting agreements. In each area, I will discuss
clinically relevant research topics.
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Interrupting Escalation
Peace researchers and students of crises have many suggestions about interrupting
escalation. For example, Osgood (1962) suggests utilizing unilateral initiatives
as part of a clearly announced series of actions, a strategy he calls GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction).
Others emphasize a "tit for tat" strategy, reciprocating the adversary's
moves (Axelrod, 1984). This means reciprocating positive and negative sanctions
at the same level as the adversary. The differences between positive and negative
sanctions has been elaborated by Baldwin (1971). Research on the effectiveness
of different mixtures of positive and negative sanctions in initiating deescalating
efforts is only beginning (Kriesberg, 1981).
The works of Sharp (1973) and Wehr (1979) emphasize how nonviolent
strategies can limit escalation of conflicts. More attention to the applications of
self-limiting means of struggle, even in international conflicts, is needed.
Intermediaries can play a variety of significant roles in interrupting escalation or in deescalating conflicts. This can take the form of nongovernmental,
informal transmission of information, facilitating meetings among adversaries,
suggesting new procedures when old ones have led to stalemates, suggesting
substantive ideas for new solutions, and giving legitimacy to solutions that one
or another' party would otherwise find difficult to accept (Burton, 1969, 1985;
Fisher and Ury, 1978; Kelman, 1977).
There have been many analyses of cases to assess the applicability of
particular strategies. For example, Etzioni (1967) analyzed President Kennedy's
American University speech and subsequent actions relating to the 1963 Partial
Nuclear Test Ban Agreement as an example of the effectiveness of the GRIT
strategy. Holsti, Brody, and North (1964) analyzed President Kennedy's handling
of the Cuban missile crisis, arguing that the US government's responses were
measured and equivalent in intensity to the Soviet government's actions; thus
successfully managing the conflict without uncontrolled escalation. Leng (1984)
examined three US-Soviet crises and found that US threats of force were generally
reciprocated with defiance, which was not likely when other inducements were
used.
Several studies have been done of intermediaries in international conflict.
For example, Wolf (1978) examined the major international conflicts between
1920 and 1965; those which involved the intervention of global institutions were
much less likely to be resolved by recourse to violence than were those which
used only state procedures.
Despite the many studies about interrupting escalation, controlling crises,
and initiating deescalation, the inconsistencies among the ideas have not been
reconciled. We need much more specification to assess the relative contribution
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of the balance of coercive and noncoercive inducements, of unilateral initiatives,
of intermediaries, and of the content of the proposals in limiting escalation and
beginning deescalation. Such specification must include the conflicts' structure,
stage, and environment. In developing propositions and hypotheses about crisis
management, interrupting escalation, and initiating deescalation, many middlerange social theories are relevant. Specially pertinent are theories of social exchange, coalition formation, influence, and the bases and emergence of social
conflicts.
Conduct of Negotiations
Many suggestions have been advanced describing how to negotiate successfully,
but not all of them are consistent. For example, it is argued that conflict resolution
would be facilitated if a conflict were broken into many issues, if it were fractionated (Fisher, 1964). On the other hand, it is argued that the linkage of several
conflict issues can provide the basis for trading off benefits from one outcome
against losses from another.
Another issue concerns the content of the proposals being made—to what
extent do the proposals recognize the adversaries' interests and not merely assert
one side's positions (Fisher and Ury, 1981). Paying attention to the adversary's
interests requires openness in the course of negotiations. In international negotiations, however, the complexity of matters in dispute often leads to lengthy
domestic negotiations, then rigidity in international negotiations.
It can also be argued that careful preliminary work is very helpful to successful negotiations (Raiffa, 1982). The negotiators can better assess their priorities, consider the possible priorities of the adversary, invent possible outcomes
which would maximize mutual benefits, and also assess what is their best alternative to a negotiated agreement as a fall back position.
The role of mediators is also a matter of contention. Some analysts argue
that mediators should play an active role, suggesting possible solutions; others
argue that mediators should be essentially facilitators and avoid making suggestions about possible outcomes (Burton, 1969; Fisher, 1978). Some analysts
argue that mediators should be—or at least strive to appear to be—neutral; others
argue that neutrality is not possible and honesty and fairness in conduct is what
is important (Kriesberg,1982; Laue and Cormick, 1978).
To assess these and other ideas about mediation, we need to specify the
kind, stage, and context of conflict under consideration. In the case of US-Soviet
relations, nongovernmental intermediaries, international organization officials,
and representatives of nonaligned and allied governments have all attempted to
play intermediary roles. We need systematic comparisons of varying consequences of different kinds of intermediary activity for different kinds of conflicts
(Touval, 1978; Young, 1967).
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Research is needed to assess these different policy alternatives. Comparisons
are needed of many cases which vary in the characteristics of the adversaries,
the nature of the conflicts, and the negotiators (Snyder and Diesing, 1977).
Alternatively, detailed analyses of carefully selected cases might be undertaken.
Analyses have been made of concession rates (Jensen, 1984), persuasive arguments (Stone, 1967), bureaucratic politics of each side in the negotiations (Newhouse, 1973; Talbott, 1979), and different kinds of intermediaries.
Theories about bargaining and negotiation have proliferated and expanded
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Strauss, 1978; Zartman, 1977). In addition, work
on exchange theory, linguistics, communication, symbolic interaction, and conflict theory all can be drawn upon to suggest processes and conditions affecting
the conduct of negotiations.
Equitable and Long-Lasting Agreements
Even when deescalating agreements are reached, they often are short-lived. They
can sometimes generate reactions that reveal the agreement to be counterproductive. Much of the literature on conflict resolution stresses the possibility that
a conflict can have an integrative outcome—one in which the adversaries all
benefit or at least do not lose—rather than an outcome by which one party wins
at the expense of the other (Deutsch, 1973; Walton and McKersie, 1965). Presumably, integrative outcomes are equitable and should be long-lasting; they
should even lead to further conciliatory moves.
Research on the achievement and the consequences of integrative outcomes
has been inadequate. Research has focused on more easily assessed outcomes
such as disappointment. Not infrequently, after US-Soviet agreements have been
signed, some groups are disappointed and believe themselves to have been
unfairly treated. Policies should be pursued so that agreements do not create
undue disappointment but rather generate vested interests furthering the expansion of the agreements. Expanding the coalitions to gain adherents for the agreement may succeed initially but then undermine the long-run survival of the
agreements (Kriesberg, 1984). For example, commitments to modernize weapons
systems in order to gain armed services acquiescence to an arms control agreement can nullify many of the presumed benefits of the agreement.
Sociological research on the rise and fall of detente is needed, comparing
the consequences of its many component agreements. The deterioration of other
US-Soviet deescalatory episodes also needs to be examined. A comparison of
the more enduring detente between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic could be undertaken fruitfully. The role of domestic and transnational groups in the endurance of US-Soviet agreements would
be particularly appropriate for sociological analysis. For example, research is
needed about the role played by groups in the US and in the Soviet Union upon

100

CLINICAL SOCIOLOGY REVIEW/1986

the rise and fall of detente. In the US, such groups include business leaders,
grain growers, trade unions, research institutes, multinational corporations, East
European ethnic organizations, and Jewish organizations. In the Soviet Union
a comparable set of groups exist and play analogous, if less significant, roles.
Especially relevant to developing policies leading to equitable and longlasting agreements is knowledge about the processes of institutionalization and
the development of norms. That knowledge needs to be brought to bear on
international as well as national rule development. Similarly, theories of the state
and of interest groups in capitalist and noncapitalist countries could be fruitfully
related to foreign policy.
GLOBAL FACTORS
Finally, we turn to the global system within which the US and Soviet governments
contend. Three aspects of the world system increase the dangers of nuclear war
between them. First, the world system consists of nominally sovereign states in
a highly stratified system with many transnational interpenetrating organizations.
The varying power and domestic stability of many countries provide a tempting
arena for US-Soviet rivalry. Second, the world system lacks a significant shared
culture and in many areas of life there is considerable autonomy among countries.
In some ways this reduces the bases for conflict; but the lack of shared understandings and profound integration increases the chances that a fight will escalate,
once it erupts. Third, the lack of transnational institutions with authority to
develop and impose rules for conflict management raises the odds that a local
or limited fight will escalate into a major war or even a nuclear holocaust. Policy
suggestions and pertinent research possibilities in each problem area will be
noted.
Instability and Inequality
Policies might be pursued that enhance domestic stability and justice within all
countries, reduce inequities among them, or limit US-Soviet rivalry. Significant
sociological research has been done in each of these policy areas, but much more
is needed. The work in the area of domestic stability and justice has focused
upon studies of the relations between socioeconomic development and political
order, revolutions, and domestic equality (e.g., Jackman, 1975; Paige, 1975;
Weede, 1984).
We need more analyses of how domestic troubles in developing countries
do and do not attract US-Soviet rivalry and intervention. Sometimes there is
little intervention by either superpower, sometimes there is intervention by one
alone, sometimes there is simultaneous intervention by both or by their allies.
Systematic comparisons of such cases might suggest ways to better limit the

PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR

101

opportunities for the US and the Soviet Union to seek unilateral advantage. This
may include ways to limit the escalation of domestic fights or ways of involving
international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
The second policy area pertains to the development of shared understandings
and greater integration. Policies might be pursued to increase the cultural, social,
and economic exchanges in a manner that increases mutual and balanced dependence. Three major kinds of relevant research should be noted: mapping the
variety of forms of transnational interactions and bonds, particularly between
Soviet and US citizens; explaining the expansion and contraction of various kinds
of transactions; and examining of the consequences of different kinds of transnational interactions.
International transactions include the movement of people, goods, and ideas.
The movement takes the form of trade, of letter writing, of cultural and scientific
exchanges, of emigration, and of reading, viewing, and listening to cultural
products. The transactions also occur within a variety of organizational settings:
international nongovernmental as well as international governmental organizations. The extent of such transactions between different kinds of people and over
different time periods needs to be more fully known.
The sources of expansion and contraction in different kinds of transactions
need to be examined. A fundamental issue is the extent to which some of these
kinds of transactions develop autonomously and the extent to which they are
controlled by governmental policies. Another issue pertains to the relative importance of technological, normative, and organizational determinants of the
transactions' expansion and contraction.
Particularly important are studies of the consequences of different kinds of
transactions. We might ask: What impact do they have upon American and
Russian perceptions of each other? Which stereotypes are reinforced and which
are changed? What are the effects upon perceived self-interest relative to USSoviet relations? For example, do people in businesses which have no, some,
or significant trade between the US and the USSR differ in views about each
country and their relations (Jamgotch, 1985)?
Deutsch and associates (1957) have examined the development of "security
communities"—countries which come to pose no security threat to each other.
They found that high levels of integration, measured particularly by the movement of people, led to " security communities." In the past, considerable research
has been done on views of peoples as affected by visits and media exposure
among European countries and between the US and developing countries. We
need to conduct such research in the present circumstances in US-Soviet relations
(Jamgotch, 1985).
Many bodies of theoretical work are relevant to the research questions
listed—work, for example, on the effects of the mass media, on cultural diffusion,
opinion formation, socialization, prejudice, ecology, and occupations.
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The third policy area pertains to developing means of managing conflicts
and mitigating their most adverse effects. Included in this area are three kinds
of policy considerations. First, rules for guiding rivalry, disputes, negotiations,
and even wars might be developed. Second, existing international governmental
organizations (IGOs) might be improved to limit conflict escalation more effectively. Third, new and more supranational regional and global organizations
might be created.
Relevant research for each kind of policy should be undertaken. The development of rules for controlling disputes is particularly important. Even some
modern wars have been limited. We need to know how that occurs. To what
extent does it rest on constraints resulting from fear of retaliation? To what extent
does it rest on shared understandings of the appropriate level of coercion between
the adversaries regarding the particular issue in contention? What is the role of
domestic constituencies, and potential or actual allies of each side? What kind
of previous agreements are and are not effective in controlling the way fights
are waged?
One way for existing international organizations to better serve in controlling
international conflicts is to expand their membership and/or functions. Significant
work has been done on the emergence, growth, and collapse of regional, specialized, and global international governmental organizations (Etzioni, 1965;
Haas, 1964). Again, more research needs to be done on present-day IGOs and
on IGOs involving the US and the USSR. We also need much more research
on the way in which the United Nations Secretary-General, Secretariat, General
Assembly, and Security Council affect the course of international disputes. What
kind of mediating and peacekeeping activity has had what kind of consequences
under what conditions (Moskos, 1976)? We need to understand the consequences
not only of the use of violence but also of the nature of the conflict outcome.
Finally, research is needed regarding the prospects of developing truly
supranational global institutions. World government is not likely to be enacted
all at once. The ways in which regional supranational organizations have grown
and have been limited in the expansion of functions and members needs examination. The shifting course of development of the European Economic Community provides many cases worthy of analysis (Lerner and Aron, 1957).
Sociological theory about the processes of institution building and the sociology of law are obviously relevant. In addition, studies of the development
of the state, formal organizations, and the ecology of organizations are relevant.
One area of relevant research that has been investigated is that of international
nongovernmental organizations. These organizations precede and solidify IGOs;
they also provide opportunities for interactions which can mitigate international
conflicts (Evan, 1981; Galtung, 1980).
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CONCLUSIONS
I have indicated that sociologists need not feel irrelevant and powerless in the
face of the threat of nuclear war. Research that we can do with our sociological
skills is relevant to nuclear war avoidance. Awareness that we are part of networks
of co-workers enables us to recognize that we can make a contribution to a
cumulative enterprise.
Clinical work to prevent nuclear war is not restricted to work with the
President of the United States or the Secretary General of the Communist Party
of the USSR as clients. Research of the kind outlined here has policy relevance
for other significant clients. They include students, peace movement organizations, national governmental agencies, peace research institutes, and international
governmental organizations. The major kinds of research outlined above have
varying pertinence for different kinds of clients.
The research related to domestic conditions affecting the likelihood of nuclear war is most likely to be relevant for the practice of peace movement
organizations, foundations supporting efforts to educate the public, churches,
and educational institutions.
The research on intergovernmental interaction is of most relevance to government agencies engaged in international negotiations; the research results could
be provided through consultations or through training. Such research also has
pertinence for nongovernmental international actors, such as multinational corporations.
The research on global factors and reducing the risks of nuclear war has
particular importance for transnational organizations—governmental and nongovernmental. It is also relevant for educational institutions and government
agencies.
Neither war nor peace is the result of any single factor or condition. Each
event is a configuration of many converging factors. We can change that configuration by changing one of the constituent conditions.
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